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ABSTRACT
One-period models predict that a substantial :welfare gain would result from removing the social security earnings test. In this paper we show that such models overestimate the size of potential gains.
If one uses instead a two-period model, which captures intertempora1 effects, the net result of removing the earnings test is ambiguous.
In the presence of a personal income tax, workers who reduce their labor supply in the first period create a welfare loss which must also be considered. We use a present value model to estimate the change in lifetime welfare. We find that the net potential gain from removing the earnings test is probably small, especially when compared to the alternative of an increased personal income tax.
Life-Cycle Welfare Costs of Social Security'
Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) is the largest single federal government program. It differs from other programs in that all of its funds are raised by a specific tax, which is now second only.to the personal in~ome tax as a source of federal government revenues; in 1977 the OASI tax collected over $68 billion.
The manner in which OASI taxes are collected--through a payroll tax--and the manner in which benefits are distributed--subject to a tax on earnings--have each been the subject of economic analysis, primarily through one-period models. Single-period, income-compensated models of labor supply indicate that a payroll tax will decrease the hours an individual works. Single-period analysis of' the earnings test likewise 1 predicts that such a tax on wages will decrease labor supply. Thus one-period models predict, in unambiguous fashion, that the OASI system causes a loss in welfare.
We believe that this approach is' misleading. : If one uses instead a life-cycle model to examine OASI, the absolute welfare loss disappears; the effects of the taxes become ambiguous. What brings about this result?
We have argued elsewhere (Burkhauser and Turner, 1978) that although OASI has significantly decreased the labor supply of older men, it has had the opposite effect for younger men. We contend that responsibility for these effects lies with the method used to distribute benefits: application of an age-specific earnings test. By using a simple two-period model, this J paper will attempt to provide a more accurate estimate of the change in welfare which would result from abolishing the earnings test.
In Section 1 we capture the welfare 10S8 at older ages that is associated with the earnings test, using a traditional, oneperiod Harberger (1964) model. In Section 2 we develop a two-period model for welfare measurement that allows us to incorporate the effects of the OASI earnings test on relative wages across a worker's life and to estimate the subsequent changes on labor supply and welfare.
Working with this new model, we then, in Section 3, explore two alternatives to the earnings test. First, we estimate the total welfare gain that would result from replacing the earnings test with a lump sum tax. Second, we consider replacing it with an increatie in the personal income tax. This last, of course, presents in simplified form an alternative that an administration might well choose to implement.
THE EFFECT OF OASI ON WORK DURING THE CONSTRAI~ED PERIOD
The earnings test constraint on work, it is now clear~has significantly reduced the labor supply of older men (Baskin, 1977; Burkhauser, 1979; Quinn, 1977) . Since 1948 the labor force participation rate of men 65 and over has fallen by over 50%; fewer than one-quarter of men in this age bracket now work. More decisive, perhaps, is the 25% drop for men aged 62 to 65 after they became eligible for OASI in 1961. Fewer than 55% now work.
In developing our argument, we use the rules for the OASI earnings test that applied in 1974: a 50% marginal tax rate on all wages and salary over a yearly exempt amount ($2400 for those aged 62 to 72).
Workers over age 72 are no longer subject to the test. Figure 1 estimates the welfare cost for an individual whose market 2 wage is wand whose income-compensated labor supply curve is SL. ·In the presence of' a proportional personal income tax, earnings are lower by a rate t, so that the net wage rate is equal to (1 -t)w, labor supplied is OG, and the welfare cost of the tax is equal to the area ABC. (Owen, 1971) . We argue that the OASI earnings test is also behind this change in labor supply.
If a worker's wages are subject to an earnings test at only one period in his life, he will be induced to change his lifetime work pattern--he will substitute work in the unconstrained period for work in the constrained period (Lewis, 1957; Smith, 1975) . We have estimated that the effect of OASI has been to induce males under age 62 to work at least 2 hours more than they otherwise would have done (Burkhauser and Turner, 1978) . Previous measures of welfare effects of OASI have ignored this change in across-life labor supply effort.
The welfare effect of the substitution of work to younger ages can be estimated using a variation of the Harberger method. Rather than a one-period, two-good model, consider a one-good (labor/leisure), twoperiod model. where Sij = aXilaPj' is the compensated erdss-der±vativeof supply with respect to price, T i is the tax per unit of good i, and t· (when positive) 3 is a welfaEe loss.
Let tbe the marginal income tax rate and e be the earnings test .
tax rate, and L l and L 2 labor supplied in the two. periods. The wage rate in the first period is wI' and w 2 is the discounted wage rate in the second period. The net wage rate in the unconstrained period is then (1 -t)w l , and the discounted net wage rate in the constrained period is (1 -t -e)w 2 • Equation (1) of total labor share.
Substituting these values into the first term of equation (4), we find that replacing the earnings test with a lump sum tax causes an undiscounted welfare gain of $5.5hillion. ·This single-period measure is only the first step in measuring the full impact of OASI. The effect of the earnings test on work in the unconstrained period must also be calculated.
One-period models measuring the effect of the OASI payroll tax indicate that labor supply should fall for those age groups paying the taxes. Browning (1975) argued thdt to the degree benefits are positively related to payroll taxes, this fall in labor supply is reversed, b~t he ignored his own point in estimating a $2.7 billion welfare loss arising from a fd1l in labor during this period. But we have shown that the increase in labor supplied at younger ages--induced by the earnings test-- (Burkhauser and Turner, 1978) overwhelms this relatively small payroll 7 tax effect on wages for that group.
Next, we assume that the value of the compensated cross-elasticity of labor supply in the unconstrained period with respect to wages in the 8 constrained period is (-.06).
If we substitute this value into the second term of equation (4) resent discounted value at the beginning of work. life of all future benefits for the median OASI-covered worker aged 62 in 1974 (Burkhauser, 1979) .
Under such an assumption each worker would have an annual $615 per capita gain in the constrained period (assumed to last 10 years) and an annual $75 per capita loss in the unconstrained period (assumed to last 40 years).
If we assume a zero discount rate, the gain in the constrained pe~iod from removing the earnings test would be $6l50--row C, Table 1 . But whe~the across-period substitution effect is included, the net per capita lifecycle welfare gain decreases by almost one-half to $3150.
The specific estimates developed here should be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism. They depend heavily on the supply elasticity and cross-elasticity, as well as the discount rate and labor shares used in each period. 10 Since the welfare gain occurs in the second-period, while the welfare loss occurs in the first period,~ncreases in the discount rate will decrease the net gain from removing the earnin&s test. Re.w A uses the same assumptions as row~, except that the discount rate is 3%. In this case the bias from not considering first-period effects is even more important. If we look only at the second period impact, the welfare gain appears to be $1865 per person; but the net life-cycle gain is only $131 per person.
In the unconstrained period, decreases in the assumed value of the compensated cross-elasticity decrease the across-period substitution, lessening the bias (row C vs. row E). In the constrained period, decreases in the compensated supply elasticity will have the opposite effect. Finally, the larger tne part of labor's share of GNP that is attributed to younger workers (see note 6), the greater is the bias from excluding the cross~ubstitution effect (row E vs. row D).
Given these caveats, two results of Table 1 The net change in welfare from removing the earnings test and substituting a higher proportional income tax, the sum of equation (4) and equation (6), is now contained in equation (7). In order not to violate our annual balanced budget constraint, the increase in revenue from the tax on labor income must equal the lost revenue from the earnings test (8) where L'l and L Z ' represent the new after-tax hours worked in the two periods. The wage in the second period, w'z' is undiscounted; and Nd represents the number of older workers multiplied by the earnings test exemption amount. Recognizing the dependence of L'l and L'2 on the net wages in both periods, equation (8) Can be rewritten as (9) and using the quadratic formula a value for t b can be found. Equation (9) makes it clear that the new marginal income tax rate is sensitive to both the value of labor in the two periods and the labor supply elasticities chosen. ll In Table 2 , the new marginal tax rates necessary to replace revenue lost from rembving the earnings test vary from 31% to 34%, an increase of from I to 4 percentage points in the marginal personal income tax, where each row uses the same assumptions as its corresponding row in Table 1 . Table 2 confirms the fact that, if we use an income tax rather than a lump sum tax to replace revenues lost from removing the earnings . test, welfare gains in the constrained period ·fall and welfare losses in the unconstrained period increase.. For example, using our original·.
assumptions from row C, the income tax rate is increased to 34%, causing welfare gains in the constrained period to fall from $5.5 bi~lion to $5.3 billion and welfare losses in the unconstrained period to increase from $6.1 billion to $6.8 billion. While all the calculations in Table 1 consistent with a lifetime increase in hours worked showed that such an action resulted in a welfare gain, the same assumptions in Table 2 show that even a small welfare loss is possible, if the earnings test is replaced by an income tax.
Up to this point we have assumed that the increase in hours worked during the unconstrained period is constant througho~t that period.
Clearly this need not be the case.. It is easy to imagine that the across-period substitution of labor between ages 60 and 62 is higher than that between ages 25 and 62. Workers may be uncertain about future wage rates, health, or changes in the earnings test. So in rows A' and B' we are retaining our assumption concerning the average cross-substitution to the unconstrained period; but letting the yearly croBs-substitution :1:2 increase linearly over the entire unconstrained period.· In the undiscounted case, such changes in the pattern of labor suooly do not affect the welfare calculations. When there is a positive discount rate (W.ow· A and row B), however, the greater the share of substitution during older unconstrained ages, the greater is the welfare. gain from removing the earnings test.
CONCLUSIONS
Removing the earnings test results in a substantial welfare gain for workers during the constrained period of their lives. But in a twoperiod model, the net effect is ambiguous,~ince removing the-earnings test has an intertemporal labor supply effect. In the presence of a personal income tax, the across-period substitution effect on work at younger ages results in a welfare loss.
Given the crudeness of the assumptions necessary to make the calculations, the net effect of these two changes in life-cycle welfare cannot be firmly determined.. But from our analysis it is clear that any estimate of the net effect of OASI which does not take this acrosslife substitution effect into account greatly overestimates the true welfare costs of OASI. Furthermore, across our range of estimates, the impact of removing the earnings test on welfare appears to be small, especially when it is replaced with a higher personal income tax. 2 Throughout our analysis we make the following conventional assumptions: (1) a labor supply curve that is income-compensated;
(2) full employment; and (3) 8 Using Ghez and Becker (1975) estimates for the intertempora1 elasticity of substitution, we (Burkhauser'and Turner, 1978) A more sophisticated model would allow for a nonzero probability of death in each year.
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The examples in Table 1 were constrained to those cases in which total income-compensated lifetime labor supply increased when the earnings test was removed.
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